Mamdani won with a variation on the Obama coalition (upscale whites, liberals, Latinos, and other non-white workers and small business people, and young voters). Indeed, his ability to get young voters to follow him on social media, to support him, and then register and vote will be studied closely in the coming months. Andrew Cuomo was a three-time governor with the support of major labor unions — and oodles of money for paid advertising — facing a guy with 1% support. It shouldn’t have been close, but in the end, Cuomo won 44% of the vote to Mamdani’s 56%.

New York is an atypical city; according to the Pew Research Trust’s survey of religions, there are as many Jews (8%) as white evangelical Protestants. Moreover, 3% of the population is comprised of Muslims; 2% are Hindus. Whites make up around 32% of the population, that is, less than half of Pennsylvania (almost 76%).

Pennsylvania is also older — and more rural — than New York City, but its demographics and its religious composition are both rapidly changing. In 2007, 82% of Pennsylvanians identified as Christian; in 2024, that figure was about 62%. Mainline Protestants went from 25% to 15%; Catholics from 29% to 22%; black Protestants from 7% to 5%. The proportion of white Evangelicals (19%) and Jews (2%) remained the same. There are now as many Muslims and Hindus as Jewish Pennsylvanians.

The biggest change, however, is in the religiously unaffiliated. In 2007, 13% of Pennsylvanians identified with no religion; now it is 30%. Why this is the case is hotly debated. This seems in part a reaction to the politicization of Christianity. If you aren’t troubled by gay marriage or trans athletes, but your denomination is, then it’s easier to say you’re not a Christan than to find another church.

It’s also plausible that declining religiosity results from the economic distress in rural and suburban areas that earlier plagued deindustrialized inner cities. Throughout society, there are fewer volunteer organizations and churches are fundamentally a type of community.

One telling figure in the Pew survey is that the number who attend church services once a week has basically halved since 2007 (39% to 22%) while the number who never attend has doubled (25% to 53%).

These religious changes are as important as the increasing ethnic and racial diversity of Pennsylvania to understand its politics. One example is abortion. According to Pew, in 2007, a majority of Pennsylvanians (53%) believed that abortion should be legal in all/most cases. In 2024, 68% supported that view. Likewise, with homosexuality, in 2007, 54% of adults thought that homosexuality should be accepted; today, that is 70%.

Of course, not all these changes overlay neatly onto political ideology, as the same proportion of people in 2024 say that they are conservatives, moderates or liberals as in 2007. Indeed, more now identify with the GOP: 49% in 2024 compared to 36% in 2007. Of course, what conservatism or liberalism meant almost 20 years ago is quite different than what people believe today.

So, could someone like Mamdani win in Pennsylvania? In some sense, that’s already happened.

Pennsylvania already has a state senator, among other elected officials, affiliated with the Democratic Socialists of America. The last time there were socialist officials in the state capitol was a century before, when the Socialist Party had two state House members from Reading. Led by James Mauer, they pushed for old-age pensions, a shorter work week and child labor laws.

The other Mamdani-like figure that we’ve seen is John Fetterman. As a candidate, Fetterman ran as a progressive who had endorsed Bernie Sanders. Moreover, his campaign had a dynamic social media presence that skewered his opponent, Dr. Mehmet Oz, as being out of touch and, worse, out of state. At the time, he broke with decades of Pennsylvania Democratic politics, running as unabashedly pro-choice and a progressive on climate change. He won voters under 30 by 28 points. Two years later, only 28% of young voters support him. His social media team has long since decamped over his stances on Trump and Gaza.

As a candidate, Fetterman mocked Joe Manchin. As a senator, Fetterman resembles his erstwhile nemesis and consequently is increasingly unpopular with Democrats and supported by Republicans.

The point remains, however, that Pennsylvania remains fertile ground for a populist politician who can address the economic frustrations of an increasingly diverse citizenry. Certainly, Donald Trump proved that point in 2024 when he assembled a more diverse political coalition than he did in 2016 or 2020. His success was due, in no small part, to his command over text-based social media, like X.

Mamdani also shows the declining political power of traditional media. According to its former public editor, the New York Times continues to campaign against him on the opinion and news pages. Likewise, the airwaves before the Democratic primary were filled with Cuomo ads, but they didn’t seem to matter.

In part, we live in a more fractured media environment than Cuomo understood. Mamdani is a master of the digital media environment that is more fractured than X, and more visual than X. Ezra Klein interviewed Chris Hayes on the communications strategy of Mamdani, and how fundamentally different it is than traditional Democrats since he is a product of it, so he showed a greater aptitude for how to communicate through it.

In any event, the number of people reading the Times is declining, and tends to be older and more educated than the young and the working poor who are watching videos on social media. Pennsylvania’s next populist politician, whether of the left or the right, will likely be able to speak in the language that Pennsylvania’s voters recognize as their own.