The pilot of a LifeStar medical helicopter killed nearly three
years ago after crashing into a heavily wooded area near Bradford
Regional Airport, failed to maintain proper control of the
aircraft, according to a report issued by the National
Transportation Safety Board.
The probable cause report also indicated that improper air
traffic control procedures by the approach controller in Cleveland,
pilot workload and night instrumental meteorological conditions
also played a part in the crash, which killed Heinz Schulz of
Erie.
An examination of the wreckage revealed no mechanical
abnormalities, according to the report. A preliminary report on the
crash was written in October 2005.
“Examination of voice communication tapes revealed that the
controller used non-standard approach clearance procedures, did not
comply with requirements for weather dissemination and didn’t
comply with the appropriate intercept angle of 45 degrees for
helicopters as prescribed by Federal Aviation Administration
orders,” the report indicates.
The accident occurred on Oct. 7, 2005, while Schulz was on a
refueling mission to the airport after dropping off two other crew
members to prepare a patient for transport from Kane Community
Hospital to Pittsburgh.
The crash – near Lindholm Road which connects U.S. Route 6 and
Route 59 in Keating and Hamlin townships – launched a two-day
search by scores of responders, whose efforts were in vain after
Schulz was discovered dead while still in the cockpit of the
helicopter on the afternoon of Oct. 9, 2005.
Federal officials said the cockpit and cabin area of the
helicopter was “consumed by fire” after an explosion left pieces of
the aircraft strewn across a circular, 180-foot-long area.
According to the probable cause report, Schulz was “flying under
instrument flight rules in night instrument meteorological
conditions.” At the time of the crash, there were overcast
conditions reported at the airport, with 2 1/2 miles of visibility
in mist. The temperature was around 50 degrees.
The report indicates that at one point, Schulz was on the wrong
heading for Bradford Regional on his final approach to the
facility.
Officials said Schulz took off from Kane around 11:36 p.m. en
route to the airport, losing radio contact with Cleveland Center at
11:41 p.m. Schulz had indicated to the Center that he was on final
approach before contact was lost.
At one point, the air traffic controller at Cleveland Center
said “say your heading … I’ve got you heading the wrong way for
Bradford.” Schulz affirmed his intention to fly to Bradford; he was
using Instrument Flight Rules (IRL), in which the pilot relies
solely on his instruments to land.
Later in the approach, the helicopter turned sharply away from
and to the right of the inbound course, with the radar target
showing an approximate track of 100 degrees when the aircraft
disappeared. The report indicates the final three plots of the
radar track showed a sharp left turn back towards the localizer
course with an approximate ground speed of 55 knots.
A witness – who was not identified – that lived about a mile
from the crash site said while he didn’t see the helicopter, he
heard it pass overhead. The witness said he was familiar with the
sound, as he lived close to the final approach course for Runway 32
for several years.
According to the report, the witness said the sound of the
helicopter was louder than usual and the craft was lower than
normal. The witness described the sound of the craft as smooth and
continuous, with no change in aircraft noise. The explosion
following the crash was heard soon after.
Officials said when questioned about the approach to Runway 32,
the controller was unable to estimate the altitude at the point the
helicopter passed over the instrument landing system (ILS) for the
runway. When he issued the approach clearance, the controller
stated ” … cleared ILS three two uh runway at Bradford uh maintain
four thousand feet.”
“The controller was unable to explain what he intended by
appending the 4,000 foot restriction to the approach clearance. He
also stated that when he issued the approach clearance he had no
feel for the relationship between the helicopter’s altitude and the
glideslope altitude at the helicopter’s location.”
According to the report, the pilot’s log book was not recovered,
however, some flight times were extracted from company records. In
the 90 days prior to the accident, the pilot logged 56 hours, all
of which was in the Augusta 109E – the helicopter model Schulz was
flying at the time of the crash.
At that point, the helicopter had accrued 1,905 total airframe
hours, with its most recent inspection completed on Aug. 5, 2005. A
review of the maintenance records revealed numerous entries related
to autopilot malfunctions and failures. The report indicates the
malfunctions included erratic command bars on pilot and copilot
displays and uncommanded pitch and roll oscillations that happened
during preflight checks and in flight. Over a two-year span, 10
autopilot computers were changed due to their exposure to “high
vibration levels.”
The report said an FAA laboratory in Oklahoma performed the
toxicology testing on Schulz; an antihistamine with the commercial
name of Chlortrimeton, was detected in the heart and liver. The
side effects associated with the drug include headache, fatigue and
dizziness. Users are also asked to use caution when operating a
motor vehicle or machinery.
The Mount Nittany Medical Center in State College performed an
autopsy on Schulz, who died of multiple trauma on impact.
Schulz was employed by CJ Systems Aviation Group of West
Mifflin, which contracted to provide the LifeStar service out of
St. Vincent and Hamot Medical centers in Erie.
